The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has recently delivered a highly significant judgment on the interaction between Spanish national tax rules and the European Union VAT Directive. In Case C-515/24 (12 March 2026), the CJEU examined whether the Spanish tax authorities may exclude VAT deduction on entertainment and leisure expenses under EU law, clarifying the scope of Article 176 of the VAT Directive and its implications for VAT deduction across the EU.
Background
The case concerns a dispute between Randstad España (“Randstad”) and the Spanish tax authorities. Between 2009 and 2011, Randstad provided clients with free tickets for football matches, Formula 1 events, and leisure boat trips, deducting the VAT incurred on their purchase. Following a series of verification and investigation procedures, the tax authorities issued several decisions denying Randstad the right to deduct VAT on the purchase of recreational services and ordered the settlement of the outstanding tax.
Randstad’s appeal against the tax authorities’ orders was dismissed by the Spanish Central Economic-Administrative Court (Tribunal Económico-Administrativo Central). They subsequently appealed this dismissal before the Contentious-Administrative Chamber of the Spanish High Court (Sala de lo Contencioso-Administrativo de la Audiencia Nacional), which upheld the dismissal on the grounds that the exclusion of the right to deduct VAT on such expenses was justified under the standstill clause (allowing Member States to retain pre-existing national rules at the time of accession to the EU).
Randstad argued that, under the principle of VAT neutrality, a taxable person should be entitled to deduct input VAT on goods and services used for the purposes of its business activity. In this context, Randstad maintained that the purchase of tickets for sporting and recreational events, intended to be offered to clients, constitutes business-related expenditure and should therefore give rise to a right of deduction.
Randstad further argued that the standstill clause permits only the retention of limitations already in force at accession, contending that the Spanish rules excluding deduction for such expenses cannot be justified under Article 176 of the VAT Directive, as they were not in force prior to Spain’s accession.
Legal framework
The case is governed by Directive 2006/112/EC (the “EU VAT Directive”), in particular Articles 168(a) and 176. Article 168(a) establishes a right to deduct input VAT insofar as goods and services are used for taxable transactions. Article 176 provides for exceptions, allowing certain categories of expenditure to be excluded from that right, and includes a standstill clause permitting Member States to retain pre-existing exclusions:
“Pending the entry into force of the provisions referred to in the first paragraph, Member States may retain all the exclusions provided for under their national laws at 1 January 1979 or, in the case of the Member States which acceded to the Community after that date, on the date of their accession.”
In Spain, Article 96(1) of the Law 37/1992 excludes the deduction of VAT on certain categories of expenditure, on which the tax authorities relied when denying Randstad’s right to deduct:
- Jewels, jewellery, precious stones, natural or cultivated pearls, and objects made entirely or partially of gold or platinum.
- Food, drinks, and tobacco.
- Shows and recreational services.
- Goods or service intended for clients, employees, or third parties.
The central issue is therefore whether the Spanish exclusion can be justified under the standstill clause in Article 176 of the VAT Directive.
The CJEU’s judgment
The CJEU reaffirmed that the right to deduct VAT under Article 168(a) is a fundamental aspect of the VAT system which cannot, in principle, be limited; exceptions must be interpreted strictly. The Court noted that Article 176 provides an exception by allowing Member States to retain pre-existing exclusions from the right of deduction.
In the present case, the CJEU acknowledged the particular situation of Spain, noting that no VAT system existed prior to its accession to the EU in 1986:
“The entry into force of those national provisions has not led to actual changes for economic operators which, in the absence of a system of VAT before the entry into force of those provisions, were not able to deduct input VAT on the expenditure in question.”
As a result, although the restriction on deduction entered into force at accession, it formed part of the initial VAT framework introduced in Spain. The CJEU therefore found that the Spanish rule fell within the standstill clause.
Additionally, the CJEU emphasised that the exclusion of recreational and representation expenses from the right to deduct is consistent with the logic of the VAT system, given their close connection to private consumption. It noted that the VAT Directive permits the exclusion of expenditure not strictly related to business activities, such as that relating to luxury, leisure, or representation. Moreover, it found that the Spanish Law 37/1992 identifies with sufficient precision the goods and services subject to this exclusion, thereby preventing the introduction of overly broad limitations on the right to deduct.
In light of this interpretation of EU law, it remains for the Spanish Supreme Court to give a final ruling on the dispute between Randstad and the tax authorities.
Clarification of the standstill clause
At EU level, the CJEU clarified (paragraph 30) that the standstill clause in Article 176 permits the retention of exclusions forming part of the initial VAT framework of a Member State, provided that their scope has not subsequently been extended:
“[…] It is clear from an analysis of the scope of the standstill clause laid down in the second paragraph of Article 176 of the VAT Directive that it does not preclude a provision which brings about the retention in the legislation of a Member State of an exclusion which existed prior to its accession to the European Union, in so far as the scope of that exclusion remains unchanged.”
In this sense, the CJEU adopts a functional approach by focusing on determining whether the scope of the national rule has been altered over time rather than its formal adoption. In doing so, it confirms that restrictions introduced as part of the initial VAT system may fall within the standstill clause. This is consistent with earlier case-law, notably Lotos Group (C-225/18), which is often cited in the present case.
Limits of VAT neutrality and harmonisation
The judgment therefore confirms that VAT neutrality, though fundamental to the VAT system, is not absolute. Expenditure closely linked to private consumption (such as entertainment and client-related expenses) may legitimately be excluded from deduction. More broadly, the judgment highlights the limits of harmonisation within the EU VAT system, as Member States remain entitled to maintain differing rules on the deductibility of certain categories of expenditure under the standstill clause.
Conclusion
The judgment confirms that Member States may retain restrictions on VAT deductibility for entertainment and similar expenses where these form part of their initial VAT framework and have not been extended. For businesses, this highlights the need to assess the deductibility of such costs on a jurisdiction-specific basis, particularly where standstill provisions apply. In practice, they should be cautious when assuming deductibility on client-related and leisure expenses to mitigate the risk of pushback by tax authorities.
The CJEU’s reasoning reflects a pragmatic approach, focusing on the effects of national rules so as to avoid disadvantaging Member States with different pre-accession systems. While this promotes a degree of coherence across the EU, it also confirms a relatively flexible interpretation of the standstill clause.
Amelia Gibbins
Vilá Abogados
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27th March 2026
